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Royal H. Brin, Jr.*
I. AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
Uninsured Motorist Coverage. In terms of number and importance, the
most significant developments in automobile and liability insurance during
the period encompassed by this survey occurred again in the area of unin-
sured motorists insurance.
In Stagg v. Travelers Insurance Co.' the plaintiffs, two brothers and their
sister, were injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist. The three
minor children brought suit on the uninsured motorist's endorsement at-
tached to a garage liability policy issued by defendant to their father. Al-
though the policy covered two cars, the endorsement only applied to one.
Defendant insurer claimed that the automobile in which plaintiffs had been
injured was not the auto menftioned in the uninsured motorist endorsement,
but rather, was an auto owned by the plaintiff-son. In sustaining the trial
court's judgment for defendant, the court of civil appeals held that the au-
tomobile involved in the collision was not the "one owned auto" referred
to in the uninsured motorist rider on which suit was brought, regardless of
whether the father or the son was the true owner. Since the endorsement
did not apply to plaintiff's car, the exclusion in the policy itself of "bodily
injury to an insured while occupying a highway vehicle (other than an in-
sured highway vehicle) owned by the named insured ... or any relative resi-
dent in the same household as the named or designated insured ."2 was
fully applicable and barred recovery. The court dismissed plaintiff's conten-
tion that the exclusion was void as an improper restriction on coverage, not-
ing that its validity had been upheld in other jurisdictions considering the
question, and that the Texas 'Insurance Codes in no way prohibits the exclu-
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. The author
gratefully acknowledges the very considerable assistance of Susan Hamelin in the prep-
aration of this Article.
1. 486 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972).
2. Id. at 400.
3. (1) No automobile liability insurance (including insurance issued pur-
suant to an Assigned Risk Plan established under authority of Section 35
of the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act), covering liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle
shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state unless coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto, in the limits described in the
Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, under provisions pre-
scribed by the Board, for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease,
including death, resulting therefrom. The coverage required under this
Article shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy
shall reject the coverage; and provided further, that unless the named in-
sured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be pro-
vided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured
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sionary language at issue. The court construed the provision as designed to
require the named insured to secure additional uninsured motorists coverage
for himself and for vehicles owned by relative residents of the same house-
hold and sanctioned its inclusion in uninsured motorist insurance policies.
A few months later, the reasoning in Stagg was adopted by the El Paso
court of civil appeals in construing a similar policy provision in Garcia v.
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.4 In this case, the automo-
bile involved in a collision with an uninsured motorist was owned by the
father of the named insured, who resided in the same household. A sum-
mary judgment was affirmed denying coverage to the named insured and
to his passenger who was also an insured under the policy definition. The
court buttressed the Stagg rationale by noting that the provision of article
5.06-1 giving the insured the option to reject uninsured motorist coverage
indicates that writing a policy without such coverage would not violate public
policy.
In Bilbrey v. American Automobile Insurance Co." the Eastland court of
civil appeals delivered a somewhat cryptic opinion, holding that the exclu-
sion of an automobile furnished for the regular use of a named insured from
the definition of uninsured automobile did not preclude an insured driving
such an automobile from recovering under his uninsured motorist endorse-
ment. In support of its opinion that exclusions and other provisions of the
policy did not limit or abridge the uninsured motorists coverage, the court
cited an Ohio case6 which held that such coverage is personal accident cov-
erage7 and becomes effective whenever the named insured sustains injury
as a result of the operation by a third party of an automobile without bodily
injury liability coverage. The Ohio court found that the coverage was in
no way dependent on the character of the vehicle, if any, being operated
by the insured at the time of the accident. The result and reasoning in
Bilbrey appear contrary to Stagg and Garcia, although a different exclusion
is involved.
Attempts to limit payments under uninsured motorists insurance policies
in the form of offsets for workmen's compensation or medical insurance pay-
ments have met with summary rejection. In Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Mc-
Mahon a Texas appellate court was faced for the first time with determining
the validity of a policy provision approved by the Texas Board of Insurance
reducing the amount payable for bodily injury under an uninsured motorists
endorsement by "the amount paid and the present value of all amounts pay-
has rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to
him by the same insurer.
T x. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Supp. 1974).
4. 490 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973).
5. 495 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973).
6. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bittler, 14 Ohio Misc. 23, 235 N.E.2d 745 (C.P.
1968).
7. See Bogart v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 473 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973), and Re-
liance Ins. Co. v. Falknor, 492 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973), error ref. n.r.e., denying statutory penalties and attorney's fees to plaintiffs re-
covering judgments on uninsured motorists insurance policies on the rationale that such
insurance is not accident insurance,
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able on account of bodily injury under any Workmen's Compensation law."
The majority found the Texas Supreme Court's decision in American Lib-
erty Insurance Co. v. Ranzau,9 holding that an attempt to limit recovery
with an "other insurance" provision was invalid, to be dispositive of the issue
and affirmed the trial court's refusal to give effect to the provision. In con-
struing the same provision a few months later the court in Hamaker
v. American States Insurance Co.10 reached the same result without any ap-
parent reliance on McMahon.
In two other noteworthy cases courts struck down a provision in an un-
insured motorists policy which relieved the insurance company of that part
of the damages representing expenses for medical services paid or payable
under another portion of the same policy. In Bogart v. Twin City Fire In-
surance Co." the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the medical payments
offset clause void as contrary to public policy. With no Texas appellate
case directly on point, the court justified its holding as a logical extension
of the decisions of Texas courts in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Gatlin,12 Ran-
zau, and McMahon. The court's assessment of the provision's probable
treatment by state courts was proven accurate some months later when the
Waco court of civil appeals adopted the rationale and resolution of the
the Bogart case in Dhane v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.'
3
Both Bogart and Dhane also dealt with the problem of the right of an
insured to stack uninsured motorists benefits. The plaintiffs in both cases
had paid separate specified premiums for uninsured motorists coverage of
multiple vehicles described in their respective policies. A four-dollar pre-
mium was paid for coverage for automobile number one which in both cases
was the auto involved in the collision and a three-dollar premium was paid
for coverage for each additional insured automobile. The plaintiffs main-
tained that the payment of premiums for the additional automobiles also
protected them while riding in automobile number one. In each case the
court held that such a conclusion was precluded by the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Ranzau.14 The courts found, however, that the "two or
more automobiles" clause' 5 allowed stacking of medical benefits under the
policies.
Two other portions of the court's opinion in Bogart deserve attention.
First, the court denied the right of an intervening workmen's compensation
carrier to subrogate itself to any part of the judgment against the uninsured
motorists carrier because the statute defining subrogation rights made no
8. 487 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
9. 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972).
10. 493 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
11. 473 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973).
12. 470 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971). For a synopsis of the hold-
ing and history of Gatlin, see Brin, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27
Sw. L.J. 135 (1973).
13. 497 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error granted.
14. 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972).
15. "When two or more automobiles are insured hereunder, the terms of this policy
shall apply separately to each." This clause was not applicable to the uninsured mo-
torists coverage. 497 S.W.2d at 326.
1974]
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provision for such recovery"6 and because the policy in question clearly ex-
cluded workmen's compensation carriers from benefiting under its uninsured
motorists section. 17  Secondly, the court overruled the lower court's award
of penalties and attorney's fees on the uninsured motorists insurance recov-
ery, holding that the statute governing their award was not designed to apply
to uninsured motorists coverage, and further, that the peculiar nature of that
coverage rendered statutory penalties distinctly inappropriate. Sanction for
this latter finding was implicitly given subsequently in Reliance Insurance
Co. v. Falknor18 which held that uninsured motorists insurance is not acci-
dent insurance and, consequently, a judgment under such coverage provides
no basis for an award of statutory penalties or attorney's fees.
In spite of Bogart and Dhane, the issue of stacking uninsured motorists
coverage is by no means settled in Texas. Two cases,19 criticized by the
court in Dhane, allowed an insured who had paid separate premiums for
uninsured motorists coverage on more than one automobile, to stack the ben-
efits attributed to each premium payment. In view of the conflict, the
Texas Supreme Court has granted writs, and a final resolution may be ex-
pected shortly.
Subrogation. The rights of an uninsured motorists insurance carrier to re-
cover from the uninsured motorist for damages sustained by the insured are
governed by the rules ordinarily applicable to subrogation. Therefore, if the
subrogor's claim is barred by the statute of limitations, the subrogee's claim
is also barred. This result was reached in Sheppard v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. 20 over the insurer's contention that the appropri-
ate rule should be analogous to that employed in workmen's compensation
cases, that is, that the insurer has no cause of action against the uninsured
motorist until its liability to the insured is adjudged.
"Sistership Exclusion." In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Parker Products2' the su-
preme court affirmed the holding of the court of civil appeals 22 that the ap-
pellant's general liability policy provided coverage for a claim against its in-
sured arising out of the insured's sale of candy mix flavorings containing
paper to an ice cream maker. The flavorings were incorporated into the ice
cream maker's product, which was thereby rendered worthless. The insur-
ance company contended that the so-called "sistership exclusion" 28 barred
16. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1967).
17. "This policy does not apply under Section III [uninsured motorists section] so
as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's compensation or dis-
ability benefits carrier or any person or organization qualifying as a self-insurer under
any workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or any similar law." 473 F.2d
at 628 n.15.
18. 492 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
19. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 494 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1973), error granted; Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Turner, 498
S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973) (in which the supreme court
has indicated that it is withholding action on the application for a writ pending its
decisions in Dhane and Tucker).
20. 496 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973).
21. 498 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1973).
22. 486 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972).
23. The insurance does not apply:(n) to damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, repair, replace-
[Vol. 28
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Parker's recovery. Finding no cases construing this relatively new provision,
the court adopted a hombook construction confining the exclusion to dam-
ages other than injury to or destruction of the property itself.
Estoppel. An insured's signature on a general non-waiver agreement does
not prevent an insurance company when it is using the same attorney to
represent the insured in a personal injury action, and simultaneously to
work against the insured on the coverage question, from being estopped to
assert denial of coverage. The company and the attorney have an obliga-
tion to notify the insured of any actual or potential conflict of interest, and
their silence in the face of such a conflict, which prejudices the insured, may
give rise to an estoppel from which the non-waiver agreement affords no
relief. The court in Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley24 held that prejudice
sufficient to effect an estoppel was shown by the defendant, who made his
employees available for statements on his own time and at his own expense,
and was not advised of the conflicting interests of his attorney.
Notice. In Lopez v. Royal Indemnity Co.25 the court examined application
to uninsured motorist coverage of the notice provisions in an automobile li-
ability policy. The court assumed without deciding that the general notice
provision applied to the coverage, but went on to hold 'that in determining
whether notice was given as soon as practicable, the proper rule is one of
discovery similar to that employed in medical malpractice cases. In Dairy-
land County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roman26 the supreme court rejected
the court of civil appeals holding27 that a minor is excused from complying
with the notice provisions of an accident insurance policy. Rather, minor-
ity is but one circumstance to consider in determining whether notice was
given as soon as practicable.
Vehicular Definition. In an expansion of the holding reported last year that
a pickup truck is included within the definition of private passenger auto-
mobile,28 the court in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Corp. v. Lowery29
held inapplicable an exclusion of coverage when the insured vehicle is tow-
ing a trailer, unless the trailer is designed for use with a private passenger
automobile. In Lowery the vehicle involved in the accident was a pickup
towing a gooseneck trailer. A gooseneck trailer is designed for use with a
truck and cannot be used with a sedan-type automobile. Over a vigorous
dissent, the majority held that since the pickup was a private passenger auto-
mobile under the terms of the policy, the exclusion clause had no applica-
ment, or loss of use of the named insured's products or work completed
by or for the named insured or of any property of which such products
or work form a part, if such products, work or property are withdrawn
from the market or from use because of any known or suspected defect
or deficiency therein ....
498 S.W.2d at 678.
24. 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973).
25. 496 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973).
26. 498 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973).
27. 486 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972).
28. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Durrett, 472 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1971).
29. 490 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
19741
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tion because the gooseneck trailer was designed for use with this type of
private passenger automobile.
Coverage under a policy insuring against direct loss from "land vehicles"
where that term is not defined is not limited to instances where the vehicle
is being used as a vehicle. In North River Insurance Co. v. Pomerantza0
the court employed this construction to affirm a finding that the appellant
was liable for damages to a wiring system caused when the bucket of a back-
hoe attached to a tractor hit an underground electrical conduit while digging
a ditch. The court held that the tractor did not cease to be a land vehicle
by being made stationary and by being used for purposes other than trans-
portation.
Owned Automobile. A standard automobile policy provision defining
owned automobile as a "private passenger, a farm or utility automobile de-
scribed in this policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that cov-
erage is afforded, . . .,,ax eliminates ownership as a prerequisite to cover-
age, so that a non-owner can purchase and be covered by a policy on which
he is the named insured without actually owning the vehicle described in
the policy. In Snyder v. Allstate Insurance Co.82 the court held that the
defendant insurance company had an obligation to defend all actions and
pay all claims arising out of a collision involving the "owned vehicle" which
was given by the named insured to his daughter, and which was being driven
by a third party at her request at the time of the accident.
Intentional Property Damage. A parent, sued for property damage inten-
tionally caused by his eleven-year-old son, 83 was granted reimbursement for
the amount of the judgment under his Texas standard homeowner's policy
in Walker v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. 4  The insured claimed
coverage under the "personal liability" section of his policy, while the insurer
maintained its only coverage was under the "physical damage to property
of others" section, and limited to $250. The court allowed recovery of the
entire amount of the judgment, holding that the two coverages were sepa-
rate, with neither restricting the other.
In Argonaut Southwest Insurance Co. v. Maupin8 5 the Texas Supreme
30. 492 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
31. Snyder v. Allstate Ins. Co., 485 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. 1972).
32. Id.
33. The suit was brought under TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5923-1 (Supp.1973): Section 1. Any property owner, including any municipal corporation,
county, school district, or other political subdivision of the State of
Texas, or any department or agency of the State of Texas, or any per-
son, partnership, corporation or association, or any religious organization
whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover ac-
tual damages suffered from the parents of any minor under the age of
eighteeen (18) years and over the age of ten (10), where such minor
child maliciously and willfully damages or destroys property, real, per-
sonal or mixed, belonging to such owner. However, this Act shall not
apply to parents whose parental custody and control of such child has
been removed by court order, decree or judgment.
This provision was repealed, effective Jan. 1, 1974, by ch. 543, § 3, [1973] Tex. Laws
1458.
34. 491 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973).
35. 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973).
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Court reversed a decision of the court of civil appeals which had held that
a construction company which removed borrow material from land, pur-
suant to an agreement with one who was not the owner, was entitled to re-
cover from his insurer the amount of a judgment rendered against him in
a trespass action brought by the true owners. The court of civil appeals
had held that the removal of the material was an occurrence or accident
within the terms of the policy since plaintiffs had no intention of injuring
the true owners of the property.38 The supreme court reversed, holding that
the removal was intentional and deliberate, and also that the policy did not
purport to offer insurance 'against liability for damages caused by mistake
or error.
II. LIFE, HEALTH, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Poisoning. The widow of a policeman who died as a result of carbon mon-
oxide poisoning and suffocation from lack of oxygen while "staked out" in
a police patrol car was denied recovery under a policy of life insurance by
virtue of an exclusion for "death ... result[ing] from or . ..caused,
directly or indirectly, by ... [p]oisoning ... (other than that occurring
simultaneously with and in consequence of accidental death . . .).997 In
the face of a highly critical dissent, the court based its holding on a 1933
Texas civil appeals case construing similar policy language and reaching the
same result.88
Mail-Order Insurance. In October or November of 1969 Loy L. Hooks re-
ceived by mail an advertisement and application for an accident insurance
policy. He completed the application and forwarded it by mail along with
a twenty-five-cent premium to the soliciting company, which received it No-
vember 13 or 14. On November 15 Hooks was killed in an automobile
accident. His mother brought suit against the company seeking recovery
on the policy after her claim was denied on the ground 'that the policy was
not effective before November 21, when it was approved by the company.89
36. 485 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972). Pertinent provisions of the
policy are as follows:
1. Coverage D-Property damage Liability-Except Automobile To pay
on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become le-
gally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction
of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident.
2. Endorsement No. 7-The letters UND-1680-RI: 'Occurrence' Basis-
Property Damage. It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded by
the policy under Coverage D-Property Damage Liability-Except
Automobile applies subject to the following provisions:
1. The word 'accident' except as used in Paragraph II hereof is
amended to read 'Occurrence.'
2. The word 'occurrence' as used herein shall mean either (a) an ac-
cident, or (b) in the absence of an accident, a condition for which
the insured is responsible which during the policy period causes phys-
ical injury to or destruction of property which was not intended.
Id. at 293 n.l.
37. Pickering v. First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. of America, 491 S.W.2d 184, 185
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
38. United Fid. Life Ins. Co. v. Roach, 63 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1933), error ref.
39. Fritz v. Old Am. Ins. Co., 354 F. Supp. 514 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
1974]
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The court examined the ordinary rules of offer and acceptance under which
the contract would not be effective until accepted by the company and found
them inappropriate in the mail-order context. Looking to decisions in other
jurisdictions which had considered mail-order insurance and machine-
dispensed flight insurance, the court adopted a "reasonable expectations"
test to determine when the contract became effective. -It concluded that the
brochure advertising the policy fostered the reasonable expectation that cov-
erage began as soon as the application was deposited in the mail, and ren-
dered judgment for the plaintiff.
Scope of Coverage. A hospital, surgical, and medical policy providing pay-
ment for the cost of use of an oxygen tent does not entitle the insured to
reimbursement for the cost of inhalation therapy. Relying on the rule of
construction that terms of insurance policies should be construed in accord-
ance with their plain, ordinary, and accepted meanings, the court in Repub-
lic Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Gillard40 deduced from various dictionar-
ies that inhalation therapy is not synonymous with oxygen tent and, hence,
was not encompassed by the coverage of the policy in question.
III. FIRE AND CASUALTY
Damages. In Lerer Realty Corp. v. MFB Mutual Insurance Co.41 suit was
brought on a windstorm policy with an endorsement covering the cost, as
of the date of loss, of replacement in new condition with materials of like
size, kind, and quality, subject to the conditions that the repair, rebuilding,
or replacement had to be made within 'a reasonable time, and that total li-
ability was not to exceed the cost of repair, the cost to rebuild, or the ac-
tual expenditure incurred in rebuilding, repairing, or replacing. The jury
found that plaintiff's delay (two-and-one-half years as of the time of trial)
in rebuilding was not unreasonable and awarded $119,400, the actual cost
of replacing the building. The court modified this award to allow recovery
only of the actual cash value of the property destroyed, reasoning that the
endorsement did not come into play unless the insured actually repaired, re-
built, or replaced within a reasonable time.42
Estoppel. In reviewing Republic Insurance Co. v. Silverton Elevators,4 re-
ported here last year, the supreme court affirmed 'the lower courts' holding
that an insurance company issuing a fire policy on household goods and col-
lecting -premiums therefor with knowledge that the household goods were
not owned by the named insured waived any requirement that the named
insured own or possess a beneficial interest in the property insured.44
40. 496 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
41. 474 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1973).
42. In his dissent, Judge Godbold argued that unless the insured failed to repair
or replace within a reasonable time, the insurer was obligated to pay either the cost
to repair or the cost to rebuild or replace, whichever was smaller.
43. 477 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), error granted, reported in
Brin, supra note 12, at 137.




Comparative Negligence. The Texas Modified Comparative Negligence
Act,4 5 effective September 1, 1973, substitutes a form of comparative negli-
gence for the former rule of contributory negligence as a complete bar. It
is being discussed at greater length in the Survey article on tort law, but
with reference to its effect in the insurance field, it is particularly noteworthy
that section 2(f) provides that where the application of the rules contained
in previous subsections would result in two claimants who are liable to one
another in damages, the claimant who is liable for the greater amount
is entitled to a credit in the amount owed him by the other claimant.
This is particularly important where both parties are insured. Under the
Wisconsin statute, there is no such credit provision, so that the end result
can well be that each insurer must pay the opposing party. 46 Here, how-
ever, only one insurer would have to pay, and its net liability would be re-
duced by the amount that its insured would otherwise have recovered.
This could well result in some degree of proliferation of cross-actions.
As to the general effect of comparative negligence, it should tend to pro-
mote settlements between insurers and claimants, since it will no longer be
an all-or-nothing proposition.
Personal Injury Protection Coverage. The new article 5.06-3 of the Insur-
ance Code makes it mandatory that any automobile liability policy provide
no-fault -first party coverage not to exceed $2,500 per person for medical
expenses and loss of income or, if one is not an income producer, reimburse-
ment for necessary and reasonable expenses for services ordinarily per-
formed by the injured person for care and maintenance of the family or
family household. 47 The expenses must be incurred within three years of
the date of accident. Intentional injury to one's self is excluded, along with
injury received in the commission of a felony or while seeking to elude ar-
rest.
Guest Statute. The Texas guest statute was amended to make the require-
ment of gross negligence applicable only to a claimant related within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity to the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle. 48  Again, the predominant impact of this amendment is in
the tort field, but section l(c) has a direct impact on insurance carriers.
It provides that when any claim is made by a guest against the owner, or
operator, or his liability insurance carrier, there shall be an offset against
any recovery in such amounts 'as may have been paid by the owner, oper-
ator, or insurer for medical expenses of the guest. There is a further pro-
viso that nothing in this subsection will authorize a direct action against a
liability insurer not otherwise presently authorized.
The Unfair Claims Settlement Practice Act. This new statute,49 effective
45. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Supp. 1974).
46. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (Supp. 1973).
47. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Supp. 1974).
48. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b (Supp. 1974).
49. TEx. INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Supp. 1974).
1974]
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August 27, 1973, prohibits unfair claim settlement practices such as know-
ingly misrepresenting coverage provisions, unreasonable delay in answering
claims communications, failing to adopt and carry out reasonable standards
for prompt claim investigation, lack of good faith in making prompt and fair
settlement of reasonable, clear claims, making offers so unduly low as to
require 'filing of suit, failure to maintain a complete record of complaints
received during the preceding three years or since the date of the last ex-
amination by the commissioner, or other actions as defined by the board,
if committed without cause and performed with such frequency as deter-
mined by the State Board of Insurance. If the 'board finds an insurer sub-
stantially out of line and in need of closer supervision, it may require re-
ports at such intervals as it deems necessary. The board may also hold
hearings to review alleged violations and, upon finding them, can issue cease
and desist orders. The certificate of authority of an insurer who fails to
comply with such an order can be revoked or suspended by the board.
